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Introduction
The subsidy inherent in the current deposit-
insurance system creates perverse incentives 
for risk taking by insured depository institutions
(Kane [1985]). The thrift debacle and its atten-
dant financial and political costs have exposed
the dangers of combining virtually unlimited
federal deposit guarantees and regulatory
discretion. Federal deposit guarantees, the too-
big-to-let-fail doctrine, and capital forbearance
programs have effectively limited markets’ ability
to discipline troubled institutions. On the other
hand, principal-agent conflicts have often
produced government regulatory policies
designed to forestall disciplinary actions
against troubled banks and thrifts (Kane
[1989]; Thomson [1992]).
Armed with increased awareness of the role
played by regulatory forbearance in the thrift
debacle and in record losses from the 1980s’
bank closings, Congress passed the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991.1 The FDICIA contains four impor-
tant reforms: First, it requires prompt corrective
action for undercapitalized banks and for those
considered problem institutions by their pri-
mary federal regulator.2 Second, the FDICIA
limits Federal Reserve discount-window loans
to troubled depositories.3 Third, the FDICIA
now requires the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation to charge insured institutions a
risk-related deposit-insurance premium. Finally,
the FDICIA replaces the too-big-to-let-fail doc-
trine with the systemic-risk exception, which
codifies the terms and conditions under which
the FDIC can bail out uninsured claimants of
failed depositories.4
n 1 DeGennaro and Thomson (1996) show that capital forbearance
increased the total taxpayer bill in the thrift debacle more than 500 percent.
n 2 Carnell (1993) notes that the FDICIA does not remove regulatory
discretion but progressively limits it as an institution slides toward 
insolvency.
n 3 Todd (1993) argues that these discount-window provisions are
designed to prevent the Federal Reserve from propping up insolvent banks
through improper solvency-based loans.
n 4 Carnell (1993) contends that abuse of the exception can be 
limited by FDICIA provisions requiring written authorization from the 
Federal Reserve Chairman and the Secretary of the Treasury for financing
systemic-risk losses by a special assessment on banks’ total liabilities
(total deposits).
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investigate the laws’ effects on the value of debt
capital and deposit guarantees when general
creditors behave strategically. We present con-
clusions and policy implications in section IV.
I. Banks’ Cost of 





The following assumptions are used throughout
this paper: 1) the risk-free rate of interest is
constant; 2) capital markets are perfectly com-
petitive; 3) expectations are homogeneous
respecting the probability distributions of the
yields on risky assets; 4) investors are risk averse
and seek to maximize the utility of terminal
wealth; 5) there are no taxes or bankruptcy
costs; 6) all debt instruments are discount
instruments, so the total promised payment 
to depositors and subordinated debtholders
includes both principal and interest; and 7) the
deposit-insurance premium is paid at the end
of the period.7
In this section, we present results from
Osterberg and Thomson (1990) for a bank with
insured deposits and uninsured deposits,
extended to include general creditors. The
FDIC charges a fixed premium of r on each
dollar of insured deposits. The total liability
claims against the bank, D, is the sum of the
end-of-period promised payments to the un-
insured depositors, Bu, insured depositors, Bi,
general creditors, G, and the FDIC, z(rBi).We
assume that the FDIC underprices its deposit
guarantees on average, and that in the absence
of regulatory taxes (Buser, Chen, and Kane
[1981]), the FDIC provides a subsidy that
reduces banks’ cost of capital and increases
banks’ value.
Under these assumptions, the end-of-period
cash flows to insured depositors, Ybi, clearly
equal the promised payments to insured depos-
itors, Bi, in every state. Therefore, whatever a
bank’s capital structure may be, the value,
expected return, and cost of one dollar of
insured deposits are defined as Vbi = R –1Bi,
E(Rbi) = r, and r +r, respectively.
n 5 Title III of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
instituted depositor preference for all insured depository institutions by
amending Section 11(d)(11) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Act [12 U.S.C. 1821(d)(11)]. At the time when national depositor prefer-
ence was enacted, 29 states had similar laws covering state-chartered
banks, and 18 had depositor-preference statutes covering state-chartered
thrift institutions.
n 6 For empirical studies of the impact of depositor-preference laws,
see Hirschhorn and Zervos (1990), Osterberg (1996), and Osterberg and
Thomson (1998).
n 7 For simplicity, we assume that the deposit-insurance premium is
an end-of-period claim on the bank. This is equivalent to assuming that the
premium is subordinate to Bi and that, in effect, the bank receives coverage
while not necessarily paying the full premium. However, although this
assumption affects how the deposit-insurance subsidy enters into the
expressions in this paper and the actual size of the subsidy, it does not
qualitatively affect the results.
Shortly after enacting the FDICIA, Congress
added another potentially important measure to
limit the FDIC’s (and hence taxpayers’) ex-
posure. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 created a national depositor-preference
law, changing the priority of depositors’ (and
thus the FDIC’s) claims on the assets of failed
banks by making other senior claimants subor-
dinate to depositors.5 In other words, Congress
implemented depositor preference in an effort
to reduce the FDIC’s losses by changing the
capital structure of banks.
This paper analyzes the impact of depositor-
preference laws on banks’ cost of debt capital
and on the value of FDIC deposit guarantees.6
We extend the single-period-cash-flow version
of the capital-asset pricing model, presented by
Chen (1978) and modified by Osterberg and
Thomson (1990, 1991), to include depositor
preference. In this model, the value of a firm is
the present value of its future cash flows. The
values of a firm’s debt and equity are the pre-
sent values of these claims on the firm’s cash
flows. Riskless cash flows are discounted at the
risk-free rate of interest. Risky cash flows are
converted to certainty-equivalent cash flows by
deducting a risk premium from the expected
cash flow. In this model, the risk premium is
simply the market price of risk, multiplied by
the covariance of the risky cash flow with the
market portfolio.
In section I of this paper, we present the
results of a single-period analysis of a bank that
has both uninsured and insured deposits and
subordinated debt, as derived in Osterberg and
Thomson (1991). Section II extends our 1991
analysis to include the intended impact of
depositor-preference laws. In section III, we
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of and the required rate of return on uninsured
deposits are
(1) Vbu=R–1{Bu[12F (D2S)]
+[Bu /(D2S )]CEQ D–S
0 (X)}
and





Equation (2) shows that the cost of debt
(uninsured-deposit) capital is a function of 
the bank’s systematic risk, as measured by 
lCOV(X,Rm); total promised payments to
depositors and the FDIC, (D2S); the probability
that losses will exceed the level of subordi-
nated debt, F(D2S); and the risk-free rate of
return. Osterberg and Thomson (1990, 1991)
show that when the FDIC misprices its guaran-
tees, the cost of uninsured deposit capital also
depends on the deposit mix, because under-
priced (overpriced) deposit guarantees lower
(raise) the effective bankruptcy threshold for
senior claims, F(D2S), as well as the bank-
ruptcy threshold, F(D). Furthermore, under-
priced (overpriced) deposit guarantees increase
(decrease) the claims of uninsured depositors
relative to senior claims, Bu/(D2S), and rela-
tive to total claims, Bu/D. The size of this effect
is a function of the FDIC’s pricing error per
dollar of insured deposits and of the weight of
insured deposits in the senior creditor pool.
General Creditors
General creditors have the same priority of
claim as uninsured depositors; consequently,
they will have similar end-of-period cash flows.
Y G = G if X >D2S =Bi+Bu+G+z,
GX/(D2S)i f D2S >X >0, and
0i f 0 > X.
As before, total promised payments equal D,
and the effective bankruptcy threshold is
D2S. The value of and the required rate of
return on senior nondeposit debt are
(3) V G=R –1{G [12F (D2S)]
+[G/(D2S)]CEQ D–S








End-of-period cash flows to uninsured deposi-
tors depend on the promised payment to the
uninsured depositors and on total promised
payments minus subordinated debt:
Y bu = Bu if X >D2S=Bi+Bu+G+z,
BuX/(D2S)i fD2S >X >0, and
0i f 0 > X.
While total promised payments to debtholders
and the FDIC equal D, the effective bankruptcy
threshold for uninsured depositors is D less the
claims of subordinated debtholders. The value
B O X   1
Definition of Notation
Bi = Total promised payment to insured depositors.
Bu = Total promised payment to uninsured depositors.
G = Total promised payment to general creditors.
r = Deposit-insurance premium per dollar of insured
deposits.8
z = Total promised payment to the FDIC (rBi).
B = Total promised payment to depositors and the FDIC 
(Bi + Bu+z).
S = Total promised payment to subordinated debtholders.
D = Total promised payment (Bi + Bu + G + S +z).
Ybi, Ybu, YG, Ys, Y e, and YFDIC = End-of-period cash flows to
insured depositors, uninsured depositors, general creditors,
subordinated debtholders, stockholders, and the FDIC.
V bi, V bu, V G, V s, V e, and V FDIC = Values of insured deposits,
uninsured deposits, general-creditor claims, subordinated
debt, bank equity, and the FDIC’s claim.
Vf = Value of the bank.
E(Rbi), E(Rbu), E(RG), E(Rs), and E(Re) = Expected rates of
return on insured and uninsured deposits, general-creditor
claims, subordinated debt, and equity.
r = Risk-free rate (R =1+r).
X = End-of-period gross return on bank assets.
F (X ) = Cumulative probability-distribution function for X.
l = Market risk premium.
COV(X,Rm) = Systematic or nondiversifiable risk.
Rm = Return on the market portfolio.
CEQ(X) = Certainty equivalence of X [E(X) –lCOV(X,Rm)].
n 8 For simplicity, we express the premium as a function of insured
deposits. The results of interest are not materially affected by adopting the
more realistic assumption that premiums are levied on total domestic
deposits, insured and uninsured.
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Equation (4) shows that the cost of non-
deposit debt (general-credit) capital is a
function of the same factors as uninsured
deposits, including the bank’s systematic risk,
lCOV(X,Rm), total promised payments to
senior creditors and the FDIC, (D2S), the
probability that losses will exceed the level of
subordinated debt, F(D2S), and the risk-free
rate of return. It also depends on the size of the
deposit-insurance subsidy.
Subordinated Debtholders
The end-of-period expected cash flows accru-
ing to subordinated debtholders are
Y s = S if X >D,
X+S2D if D >X >D2S, and
0i f D2S>X.
The value of the subordinated debt and the
required rate of return on subordinated debt
capital are
(5) V S=R –1{S[12F (D2S )]2D[F (D)2F(D2S)] 
+CEQ D










Equations (5) and (6) show that the cost and
value of subordinated debt capital depend on
the probability of bankruptcy, F (D), the face
value of the subordinated debt, S, total pro-
mised payments, D, and the probability that
senior claimants will not be repaid in full,
F (D2S). Note that the last two terms in equa-
tion (6) represent the claims of subordinated
debtholders in states where they are the residual
claimants.
Equityholders
The end-of-period cash flows accruing to
stockholders are
Y e = X2D if X >D, and
0i f D >X.
The value of equity and the expected return to
stockholders are







The net value of deposit insurance is the value
of the FDIC’s claim on the bank, that is, the
value of the FDIC’s premium less the value
of its deposit guarantee. In the absence of
depositor-preference laws, the end-of-period
cash flows to the FDIC and the value of its
position are 
Y FDIC = Z if X >D, 2S,
(Bi+z)X/(D2S)2Bi if D2S >X >0, and
2Bi if 0>X,so that






Equation (9) shows that the net value of
deposit insurance is a function of the composi-
tion of the senior claims, the bank’s systematic
risk, the presence of junior debt claims in the
bank’s capital structure, the risk-free rate of
return, the effective probability of bankruptcy,
F (D2S), the level of promised payments to
insured depositors, and the deposit-insurance
premium. In fact, equation (9) can be inter-
preted as showing that the equity-like buffer
provided by subordinated debt affects the value
of the FDIC’s position by changing the proba-
bility that put options corresponding to the
FDIC guarantee will be “in the money” at the
end of the period. Equation (9) also demon-
strates that if deposit insurance is to be priced
fairly, V FDIC = 0, the premium will be influenced
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 1999 Q314
by the degree to which the bank funds itself
with claims junior to insured deposits. 
Osterberg and Thomson (1990) show that
the value of the uninsured bank is R–1CEQ0(X).
The value of the insured bank, V f, equals the
uninsured bank’s value minus equation (9),
which is the value of the FDIC’s claim. 
(10) V f =R –1{CEQ0(X)+BiF(D2S)2[(Bi+z)
/(D2S )]CEQ
D– S
0 (X )–z[12F (D2S)]}.
Equation (10) shows that the structure of a
bank’s debt (in terms of payment priority)
affects the value of the bank only through the
net value of deposit insurance to the bank. 
To see this, note that BiF(D2S)2[(Bi+z)/ 
(D2S)]CEQ D– S
0 (X) is the value of FDIC guaran-
tees, and z [12F (D2S)] is the value of the
FDIC premium. If deposit insurance is correctly
priced (that is, the value of its guarantee equals
the value of its premium), then the structure of
a bank’s liability claims does not affect the
bank’s value.
II. Banks’ Cost of




In this section, we rederive the results to
incorporate depositor preference, which sub-
ordinates the claims of general creditors to
those of uninsured depositors and of the FDIC.
As in section I, we assume that the FDIC charges
a flat-rate insurance premium of r on each dollar
of insured deposits, and that on average the
FDIC underprices its deposit guarantees.9 To
simplify the analysis, we assume that depositor
preference does not change total liability claims
against the bank, D.10 Under this assumption,
depositor-preference laws have no impact on




The end-of-period cash flows to uninsured
depositors depend on the promised payment 
to uninsured depositors and on the total level
of promised payments minus subordinated debt
and the now-subordinated claims of general
creditors:
Y bu = Bu if X >B=Bi +Bu+z,
BuX/B if B >X >0, and
0i f 0 > X.
While total promised payments to debt-
holders and the FDIC equal K, the effective
bankruptcy threshold for uninsured depositors
is B(=D2G2S). The value of—and the
required rate of return on—uninsured
deposits are 








From the standpoint of uninsured deposit
capital, depositor-preference laws have the
same impact as a requirement that banks issue
subordinated debt. That is, when uninsured
depositors and the FDIC have claims in bank-
ruptcy that are senior to those of general credi-
tors, the effective bankruptcy threshold for
uninsured depositors is lowered from D2S
to D2G2S. For uninsured depositors (and, as
we shall see, for the FDIC), the pecking order
of more junior claims is irrelevant to the value
of their own.
To assess depositor preference’s impact on
the value of uninsured deposits, we control for
possible changes in total promised payments
by normalizing their expected cash flows by
the level of uninsured deposits, and compare
uninsured deposits in banks with and without
depositor-preference laws. We then separate
the expected cash flow to an uninsured deposit
(with a par value of one dollar) in the presence
of depositor-preference debt into two instru-
ments. One is identical to the uninsured deposit
in section I; the other has the following end-
of-period payoffs and value:
n 9 The results are qualitatively the same if the FDIC charges a
variable-rate premium, so long as the deposit guarantees are mispriced.
n 10 The results for uninsured depositors, FDIC, and general-creditor
claims are qualitatively the same if we assume that depositor-preference
laws change the level of total promised payments (see Osterberg and
Thomson [1991, 1994]).
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DY bu =0 i fX >D2S,
1–X/(D2S)i f D2S >X >B,
X/B2X/(D2S)i f B >X >0, and










Equation (13) is positive; note that the first
term in the brackets is strictly greater than the
third term. Moreover, since by definition D2S>B,
the middle term is also positive. Therefore,
depositor preference must increase the value
of a dollar of uninsured deposits.
General Creditors
Under depositor preference, general-creditor
claims are junior to those of depositors and
the FDIC but senior to those of subordinated
creditors; hence, end-of-period cash flows to
general creditors are 
Y G = G if X >D2S = Bi + Bu+G+z,
X2B if D2S >X >B, and
0i f B>X.
The total promised payments to debtholders
and to the FDIC equal D, and the effective
bankruptcy threshold is D2S. The value of
and the required rate of return on general-
creditor claims are













Equations (14) and (15) show that non-
deposit debt (general credit) behaves like sub-
ordinated debt (equations [5] and [6]), except
that subordinated debt protects general credi-
tors from loss. The value of general-creditor
claims depends on the effective bankruptcy
threshold, F (D2S), the face value of their
claims, G, total promised payments to senior
claimants, B, and the probability that senior
claimants will not be repaid in full, F(B). Note
that when earnings fall between B and D2S,
general creditors are the residual claimants,
and theirs will behave like an equity claim.
Following the procedure used in the previ-
ous section, we construct the replicating port-
folio for a general-creditor claim (with a par
value of one dollar) under depositor prefer-
ence. With depositor preference, the expected
cash flow to such a claim is divided into one
part that is identical to the general-creditor
claim in section I, and a second that has the
following end-of-period payoffs and value:
DY G =0 i f X >D2S,
(X2 B)/G2 X/(D2S)i fD2S >X >B,
2X/(D2 S)i f B >X >0, and










Equation (16) is unambiguously negative.
That is, depositor preference decreases the
value of a general-creditor claim.
The FDIC’s Claim
As before, the net value of deposit insurance 
is simply the value of the FDIC’s claim on the
bank. Under depositor preference, the end-of-
period cash flows to the FDIC and the value of
its position are 
Y FDIC =  z if X >B,
(Bi+z)X/B–Bi if B >X >0, and
–Bi if 0 >X, so that
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As with uninsured deposits, the impact of a
depositor-preference law is indistinguishable
from a subordinated-debt requirement. Deposi-
tor preference affects the net value of the FDIC’s
claim by changing the senior claimants’ proba-
bility of loss and by altering the weight of the
FDIC in the pool of senior claims. 
The change in the value of the FDIC guaran-
tee on a one-dollar-par-value deposit is the
value of a security with the following cash flows
(wherer =z/Bi): 
DY FDIC =0 if X >D2S,
r2(1+r)X/(D2S)+1 if D2S >X >B,
(1+r)X/B2(1+r)X/(D2S)i f B >X >0, and
0i f 0 > X, so that




CEQ D–S(X) R                    D2S B
+
D2S2B
CEQ B (X)] >0.      B(D2S) 0
Equation (18) is positive; to see this, note that
the first term in the brackets is strictly greater
than the second term. Since we assume that on
average the FDIC underprices its guarantees, its
claim on the bank is negative; hence, the size of
the FDIC subsidy is smaller under depositor
preference.
Finally, depositor preference affects the value
of the bank entirely through its effect on the net
value of deposit insurance.
(19) Vf =R –1{CEQ0(X)2z[1–F(B)]+
Bi+z
CEQ B (X) B 0
2BiF(B)}.    
Thus, if deposit insurance is always correctly
priced (that is, if its net value to the bank is
zero), depositor preference has no impact on
bank value. But it does change the fair value of
deposit insurance and so must be accounted for
when setting the premium.
n 11 The decision to close a bank is based on one of two measures
of solvency: the incapacity to pay obligations as they mature or book-
value, balance-sheet insolvency. Inability to renew nondeposit credits
could trigger insolvency under the maturing-obligations test 
(see Thomson [1992]).
III. Banks’ Cost of







The results in section II assume that general
creditors do not respond to the subordination
of their claims under depositor preference.
However, in practice, general creditors of
insured depositories will respond to changes 
in the priority of their claims and the higher
risk that results. At the very least, general
creditors will charge the depository institution 
a higher rate of interest to compensate for the
increased risk of loss. As nondeposit funds
become more expensive relative to deposits,
institutions will lessen their funding in non-
deposit markets, thus reducing the loss buffer
afforded to uninsured depositors and the FDIC
by nondeposit creditors.
Senior nondeposit creditors might also
respond to depositor preference by reducing
the average maturity of their claims. This
response increases creditors’ ability to “run” on
the depository institution if its condition deter-
iorates. In fact, financially distressed institutions
may find it difficult or impossible to issue un-
secured nondeposit claims. This response by
nondeposit creditors to depositor preference
has two implications. First, if nondeposit
creditors can effectively exit a troubled insti-
tution before it is closed, little or no loss cush-
ion will be afforded to uninsured depositors
and the FDIC. Second, the failure of nondeposit
creditors to renew their claims could trigger 
a liquidity crisis that causes the institution to 
be closed.11
The third option for unsecured general
creditors is to take collateral against their claim.
By becoming secured creditors, they will have
transformed their claim into one that is senior
(to the extent of the collateral) to deposit claims.
This, in turn, will have two effects on the
claims of uninsured depositors and the FDIC.
First, the loss buffer afforded by general- 
creditor claims is reduced. Second (and more
importantly), the general asset pool available 
to pay unsecured claims is also reduced. If
enough general-creditor claims take collateral,
the total loss exposure of the FDIC and unin-
sured depositors could increase.
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From the standpoint of uninsured deposit
capital, general creditors’ strategic behavior has
rendered depositor claims junior to their own.
To isolate the de facto impact of depositor
preference on the value of uninsured deposits
in this case, we control for possible changes in
total promised payments by normalizing
expected cash flows at the level of uninsured
deposits, and compare uninsured deposits in
banks in the presence and absence of depositor-
preference laws. We then separate the expected
cash flow to an uninsured deposit (with a par
value of one dollar) in the presence of deposi-
tor-preference debt into two instruments: one
that is identical to the uninsured deposit in
section I, and a second that has the following
end-of-period payoffs and value:
DY bu =0 i fX >D2S,
2G/(D2 S)i f D2 S >X >G, and
2X/(D2 S)i f G >X >0, so that
(22)   DVbu=[R(D2S)]–1{2G[F(D2S)2CEQG
0(X)]}<0.
Equation (22) is unambiguously negative.
Hence, a potential unintended effect of
depositor-preference laws is to reduce the




The static nature of our model does not allow
us to study the dynamic reaction of general
creditors to depositor-preference laws directly.
However, we can examine the implications of
structural arbitrage by general creditors through
its impact on the cash flows accruing to each
class of claimant. Under the assumption that
general creditors effectively collateralize their
claims on the bank, we can show the un-
intended effect of depositor-preference laws
on the cost of capital for banks and on the
FDIC’s claim.
As in section I, we assume that the FDIC
charges a flat-rate insurance premium of r on
each dollar of insured deposits and that, on
average, the FDIC underprices its deposit guar-
antees. The total liability claims against the
bank, D, are the sum of the end-of-period
promised payments to uninsured depositors,
Bu, insured depositors, Bi, general creditors, 
G, subordinated debtholders, S, and the FDIC, 
z (= r Bi). As in the previous section, we
assume that total claims, D, are not affected by




The end-of-period cash flows to uninsured
depositors depend on the promised payment 
to uninsured depositors, the total level of
promised payments minus subordinated debt
and claims, and the claims of general creditors:
Y bu =Bu if X >D2S,
Bu(X2G)/(D2 S)i f D2 S >X >G, and
0i f 0 > X.
While the total promised payments to
debtholders and the FDIC equal D, the effective
bankruptcy threshold for uninsured depositors
is (D2S). The value of and the required rate of
return on uninsured deposits are
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General Creditors
The intended effect of depositor preference is
to make general-creditor claims junior to those
of depositors and the FDIC, but senior to those
of subordinated creditors. However, the de facto
effect of depositor preference may be to make
general-creditor claims senior to all others.
Under this scenario, the end-of-period cash
flows to general creditors are
DY G = G if X >G,
X if G >X >0, and
0i f 0 > X.
The total promised payments to debtholders
and to the FDIC equal K, and the effective
bankruptcy threshold for general creditors is
D2B2S=G. The value of and the required rate
of return on general creditor claims are








Equations (23) and (24) show that the value
and return on general-creditor claims depend
only on the level and variability of cash flows
and the size of G. The presence and structure
of other claims on the bank do not affect the
valuation of such claims because we have
assumed that general creditors have de facto
secured the most senior claim on the bank.
Following the procedure used in the previous
sections, we construct the replicating portfolio
for a general-creditor claim (with a par value 
of one dollar) under depositor preference. 
The expected cash flow to a such a claim is
divided into one part that is identical to the
general-creditors claim in section I, and another
that has the following end-of-period payoffs
and value:
DY G =0 i fX >D2S,
12X/(D2S)i f D2S >X >G, and
X/G2 X/(D2S)i f G > X>0, so that
(25) DV G=R21{[F(D2S)2 F(G)]2[
CEQ D–S







Whether the value of general-creditor claims
increases or decreases depends, in this case,
on whether the difference between the first two
bracketed terms in (25) is larger than the differ-
ence between the second two bracketed terms.
The FDIC’s Claim
As before, the net value of deposit insurance
is the value of the FDIC’s claim on the bank.
Under depositor preference, end-of-period
cash flows to the FDIC and the value of its
position are 
Y FDIC =z if X >D2S,
(Bi + z 2G)
X/(D2S)2Bi if D2S >X >G, and
2Bi if G >X, so that
(26)  V FDIC =R –1{z [12F(D2S)]+ Bi+z2G
D2S
CEQ D–S
G (X )2BiF (D2S)}.
As with uninsured deposits, depositor-
preference law’s impact on the FDIC’s claim 
on the bank depends on the degree to which
general creditors engage in structural arbitrage.
The change in the value of the FDIC’s guaran-
tee on a one-dollar-par-value deposit is the
value of a security that has the following cash
flows (where r=z/Bi):
DY FDIC =0 if X >D2S,
GX/(Bi(D2 S)i f D2S >X >G,
2(1+r)X/(D2S)i fG >X >0, and
0i f 0 > X, so that
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Equation (27) is clearly negative. Hence, a
possible unintended outcome of the national
depositor-preference law is to reduce the value
of the FDIC’s claim on the bank—that is, to
increase the value of the FDIC’s guarantees.
Finally, depositor preference influences the
value of the bank entirely through its effect on
the net value of deposit insurance:




G (X)+BiF (D2S)]. D2S
As in the previous case, if deposit insurance is
always priced correctly (that is, if its net value to
the bank is zero), it has no impact on bank value.
However, depositor preference does change the
fair value of deposit insurance and so must be
accounted for when setting the premium.
IV. Conclusions
Using the cash-flow version of the capital-asset 
pricing model, we show how depositor-
preference laws affect the value and pricing of
claims on insured banks. The intended effect of
depositor preference is to change the bank’s
capital structure in a way that increases the value
of uninsured deposit claims and reduces the size
of the FDIC subsidy. Under the assumptions in
this paper, all general creditors would see the
value of their one-dollar-par claims reduced, to
the benefit of the FDIC and uninsured depositors.
Under less restrictive assumptions, other claimants
junior to depositors would also see the value of
their claims reduced. Overall, the intended effect
of a depositor-preference statute would be the
same as that of a mandatory subordinated debt
requirement.
Depositor-preference laws, however, have
another possible effect. Unlike subordinated-debt
holders, general creditors can act to offset the
statutory junior status of their claims.12 In its most
extreme form, structural arbitrage by general
creditors can de facto render depositor and FDIC
claims junior to those of general creditors. Hence, 
the national depositor-preference law may
actually decrease the value of depositor and
FDIC claims—that is, it may increase the value
of deposit guarantees. Ultimately, whether this
unintended effect of depositor-preference law
will dominate is an empirical issue.
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